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ABSTRACT
This thesis revisits Chief Justice John Marshall’s Native American rights cases— 
Fletcher v. Peck, Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. 
Georgia. In underscoring the need for a reconsideration of Marshall’s rulings, it 
juxtaposes scholarly critiques of his opinions against his sympathy for the plight of 
America’s original people. His decisions are examined in the context of the emerging 
law of nations and the Scottish Enlightenment. The positivist influences of Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, and Emmerich de Vattel are 
addressed. The impact of leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, particularly 
David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid, are also dealt with.
Rather than an individual intent on furthering a political agenda or fostering 
commercial and special interests, including his own, Marshall emerges as a chief justice 
who believed that the law of nations represented an integral part of the new nation’s 
jurisprudence and framed his opinions in accordance with contemporary philosophies of 
justice. His broad interpretations—and sometimes rejections—of principles advanced by 
recognized jurists and scholars suggest that Marshall did not seek to stifle the initiative 
of Native Americans or wrest their lands from them, but he sought to give them wide 
rein to develop their communities through their own institutions.
The essay also documents international jurisprudence provided by a nineteenth- 
century case that obliged justices of the Canadian Supreme Court to re-examine many of 
the issues Marshall confronted and consider the basis of his decisions. The opinions of
the Canadians provide an independent test of his rulings. Similar to Marshall, they 
grounded their opinions in positive law. Their interpretation of proclamations and 
treaties concurred with those of Marshall and their methodological approach was similar 
and at times identical. If Marshall’s decisions on Native American land rights 
represented a watershed, it was one that marked a transition to positive law, not the 
intentional marginalization of America’s original inhabitants by an ‘interested’ chief 
justice.
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JOHN MARSHALL AND NATIVE RIGHTS:
The Law of Nations and Scottish Enlightenment Influence
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 1828, the fate of Native Americans preoccupied at least two 
members of the United States Supreme Court. In September, Associate Justice Joseph 
Story traveled to Salem, Massachusetts, to deliver the official address at the town’s 
bicentennial. As he reviewed two centuries of progress since the arrival of the Puritan 
settlers on the shores of Massachusetts Bay in 1628, Story addressed the sad fate of the 
region’s original inhabitants. His tone was reflective, even sorrowful:
There is, indeed, in the fate of these unfortunate beings [Native 
Americans], much to awaken our sympathy, and much to disturb the sobriety of 
our judgment; much, which may be urged to excuse their own atrocities; much in 
their characters, which betrays us into involuntary admiration. What can be more 
melancholy than their history? By a law of their nature, they seem destined to a 
slow, but sure extinction. Everywhere, at the approach of the white man, they 
fade away. We hear the rustling of their footsteps, like that of the withered 
autumn leaves, and they are gone forever. They pass mournfully by us, and they 
return no more. Two centuries ago, the smoke of their wigwams and the fires of 
their councils rose in every valley, from Hudson’s Bay to the farthest Florida, 
from the ocean to the Mississippi and the lakes.....
But where are they? Where are the villages, and warriors, and youth; the 
sachems and the tribes; the hunters and their families? They have perished.. .The 
winds of the Atlantic fan not a single region, which they may now call their own. 
Already the last feeble remnants of the race are preparing for their journey 
beyond the Mississippi. I see them leave their miserable homes, the aged, the 
helpless, the women and the warriors, “few and faint, yet fearless still.” The 
ashes are cold on their native hearths. The smoke no longer curls round their 
lowly cabins. They move on with a slow, unsteady step. The white man is upon 
their heels, for terror or despatch; but they heed him not. They turn to take a last 
look of their deserted villages. They cast a last glance upon the graves of their 
fathers.. .They know and feel, that there is for them still one remove farther, not 
distant nor unseen. It is to the general burial ground of their race.1
1 William W. Story, ed., The Miscellaneous Writings o f Joseph Story (New York, 1972), 462-3; Marshall’s 
appreciation of Story is evident in a letter he wrote to him on December 25, 1832. Thanking Story for an 
acknowledgement, he said “Truly sensible as I am that the commendation bestowed on the Chief Justice, 
both in the dedication and preface, greatly transcends his merit.. .1 am yet deeply penetrated by the 
evidence it affords of the continuance of that partial esteem and friendship which I have cherished for so
2
Although Story’s remarks reflected the discourse of vanishing Indians that developed 
after the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 ended two centuries of bloody warfare with 
native peoples, his message had special meaning for his brethren on the Supreme Court, 
particularly John Marshall.
By the late 1820s, the aging chief justice had wrestled with legal issues involving 
white-Indian relations for almost three decades. As he witnessed mounting pressures to 
remove once great tribes westward across the Mississippi, Marshall recognized the 
pressing need to resolve the status of America’s original inhabitants—especially their 
rights to their ancestral lands and political sovereignty. In the South, the burgeoning 
white backcountry population increasingly coveted Indian lands to expand King Cotton, 
making a final clash imminent. Marshall realized that this resolution also would require 
the Supreme Court to pronounce on the division of powers between the federal and state 
governments, thus defining the new Republic as either a powerful new nation or a mere 
compact between states. In the fall of 1828, the Georgia legislature, frustrated by the 
federal government’s failure to extinguish the Cherokees’ claims in accordance with the 
1802 agreement by which the state of Georgia ceded western lands to the Union, was 
poised to enact legislation to annex Cherokee lands and promote white settlement.
Always conscious of political and social tensions, Marshall must have read 
Story’s remarks with the intellectual vigor that permitted him “to grasp a subject in its 
entirety.. .to analyze its constituent parts and understand their relation to the whole.”2 
Marshall did more than that. Replying to Story, he revealed emotion and a heightened
many years, and still cherish as one of the choicest treasures of my life. John Marshall Papers, Swem 
Special Collections, College of William and Mary.
2 Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule o f Law (Lawrence, Kan., 1996), 
15.
3
sensitivity to the plight of the very people who had terrorized the backcountry of his 
native Virginia, aligned with the British during the Revolution, and threatened the new 
Republic that he had sought to secure throughout his public life. “But I have been still 
more touched with your notice of the red man than of the white,” confessed Marshall.
“It was not until after the adoption of our present government that respect for our own 
safety permitted us to give full indulgence to those principles of justice which ought 
always to govern our conduct towards the aborigines.. .That time however is 
unquestionably arrived; and every oppression now exercised on a helpless people 
depending on our magnanimity and justice for their preservation of their existence, 
impresses a deep stain on the American character.”3
Marshall’s sentiments on the eve of his two final decisions on Native American 
land rights, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, are evidence of his 
concern for justice and humanity as well as the astuteness with which he observed social 
and political developments. They are a tribute to his enduring statesmanship in an era in 
which the forces of self-interest and individualism replaced republican virtue as the 
defining feature of the new order. Marshall’s sentiments indicate that his vision 
transcended special interests. They also cast doubt on scholarly critiques that portray 
him as the legal mastermind of the final dispossession of Native American lands.
Late twentieth-century legal and social historians who advanced such critiques 
stressed the role of land dispossession in shaping the tragic fate of Native Americans. 
Invariably, they presented America’s original inhabitants as victims in a world
3 Charles F. Hobson, ed., The Papers o f John Marshall, (Chapel Hill, 2002), 11:178-9.
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dominated by Europeans and governed by laws designed to promote the white man’s 
interests. They portrayed the law as a powerful instrument brandished against helpless 
and sometimes unsuspecting tribes. They assailed Marshall’s opinions, arguing that they 
reflected racism, political expediency, sensitivity to public opinion, and acquiescence to 
expanding commercial and financial interests, including his own.
These critiques are flawed, however, in terms of their historical representation of 
white-Indian relations and Marshall’s jurisprudence. They inadequately describe the 
complex process of land dispossession. Supporters of the ‘victimization’ approach 
usually fail to recognize Indian agency and portray Europeans and Native Americans as 
monolithic groups, neglecting the diversity of interests within each community. These 
scholars tend to ignore factions, which characterized most Indian and European 
communities throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and 
often reached across the cultural divide. Furthermore, they seldom acknowledge that 
‘the law’ was in a state of flux during this period. Reflecting unprecedented social, 
economic, political, and intellectual developments, the law changed constantly. Rather 
than a known quantity, it was ill defined, even elusive, for all parties. Discoveries of 
unknown continents and peoples accentuated uncertainty and precipitated new concerns 
about the rights of discovered peoples and discovering nations.
In light of these concerns, this essay challenges interpretations of Marshall, which 
embrace ‘Indian victimization’ and argue that special interests—political, commercial or 
personal—shaped Marshall’s opinions. It also suggests that Marshall’s rulings must be
5
considered within the context of his efforts to distinguish law from politics and to 
establish the authority of the judiciary with a view to rendering it less vulnerable to 
intrusions from the legislative and executive branches.4 Marshall grounded his opinions 
on Native American land rights on legal premises that were accepted by the leading 
scholars and jurists of his day. His rulings were shaped by his adherence to positive law 
and well-established principles of common law, a reflection of his legal education and 
his experience in the superior courts in Virginia. Marshall’s positivist approach was 
evident in his marked reliance on the Constitution, statutes, treaties, and the writings of 
international legal scholars when his opinions touched on the law of nations. Marshall 
recognized the law of nations as an integral part of the new nation’s developing 
jurisprudence. “When the United States ceased to be part of the British Empire, and 
assumed the character of an independent nation,” Marshall declared, “[it] became subject 
to that system of rules which reason, morality, and custom had established among the 
civilized nations of Europe.” For Marshall, “the faithful observance” of the law of 
nations was “essential to national character, and to the happiness of mankind.” At times, 
Marshall also emphasized principles of natural justice that were embodied in the texts of 
leading international theorists.5
In examining Marshall’s rulings on Native American land rights, the degree to 
which the Scottish Enlightenment influenced him is remarkable but perhaps not 
surprising. Scotsmen Archibald Campbell and James Thomson, who played important 
roles in Marshall’s education, were immersed in Scottish Enlightenment thinking. They 
were schooled at the University of Glasgow during Thomas Reid’s tenure in moral
4 Hobson and Jennifer Nedelsky emphasize Marshall’s separation of law and politics. See Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits o f American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework
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philosophy.6 The contention here is not that Marshall necessarily read specific works of 
the Scottish thinkers but that he was familiar with them and their ideas particularly 
David Hume on morality and justice, Adam Smith on the ‘four stages of civilization’ as 
well as property and contract law, and Thomas Reid on Common Sense Philosophy. 
Marshall’s interest in the “political essays of the day” and the books he held in his 
library reinforce this view. He owned Samuel Smith Stanhope’s Lectures, Corrected 
and Improved, on Moral Philosophy in which the President of the College of New Jersey 
expounded the ideas of the Scottish philosophers. Another of his holdings was the North 
American Review, which made numerous references to the Scots during the 1815-35 
period.7 Similar to the Founding, the ‘hidden hand’ of the Scottish Enlightenment left its 
mark on the judicial branch during its formative years.
and its Legacy (Chicago, 1990). 190-3.
5 Frances Howell Rudko, John Marshall and International Law (New York, 1991), 3.
6 Since Douglass Adair’s article on James Madison and David Hume, historical scholarship has identified 
links between the Scottish Enlightenment and the American founding Little attention, however, has been 
given to links between the Scottish Enlightenment and the development of the judiciary under Marshall. 
The most common label affixed to Marshall is that of a Lockean. R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and 
the Heroic Age o f the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge, 2001), 15, 36, 48, and 264. Douglass Adair, “That 
Politics May be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,”’ 
Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 1957.
7 Samuel Stanhope Smith’s Lectures, Corrected and Improved on Moral Philosophy (Trenton, N.J., 1815); 
North American Review  (New York, 1815). John Marshall, “The Events o f My Life: ” An Autobiographical 
Sketch by John Marshall (Ann Arbor, 2001), 15.
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CHAPTER n
MARSHALL’S FRAMEWORK FOR INDIAN LAW: FOUR CASES
Fletcher v. Peck (1810), also known as the Yazoo case, has been described as “a 
squabble between thieves.”8 It grew out of the infamous Yazoo land sales following the 
passage of Georgia state legislation in 1795 authorizing the sale of some thirty-five 
million acres of western lands at a price of about two cents an acre. Charges of 
corruption followed as most members of the legislature held shares in the four 
companies that acquired immense tracts of land, which included most of present-day 
Alabama and Mississippi. In 1796, a newly elected legislature repealed the legislation 
and passed a rescinding act that declared the earlier legislation—and subsequent sales 
made under it—null and void.
The Yazoo scandal attracted widespread attention partly as a result of the fact that 
a large number of purchasers, organized as the New England Mississippi Land 
Company, were from the Northeast. Denying any knowledge of corruption and claiming 
ignorance of the state’s intentions to revoke the initial legislation, John Peck emerged as 
the defendant in litigation that had the trappings of an arranged case between friendly 
parties whose primary aim was to validate the Yazoo land titles. The plaintiff, Robert 
Fletcher of New Hampshire, had purchased fifteen thousand acres from Peck in May 
1803. His complaint appeared to be something of a ruse; if his claim failed, then he 
possessed sound title to the land and could pursue his speculative activities. Peck’s
8 Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation o f Law and Politics (New York, 1996), 87.
profits on the sale would also be secured. Fletcher initiated proceedings in the United 
States Circuit Court in Boston in June 1803, claiming that Peck’s title, originating under 
the 1795 act, was not valid. After a judgment in favor of Peck in 1807, the case 
advanced to the Supreme Court in 1809 on a writ of error. Although the Court initially 
reversed the Circuit Court’s decision and entertained “doubts” about the “authenticity of 
the case,” in 1810 the justices acknowledged the dispute as “real” and ruled on Fletcher’s 
complaints.9
Fletcher v. Peck was one of Marshall’s two landmark opinions during his first 
decade on the Court. The other, Marbury v. Madison (1803), was the only time that he 
ruled an act of Congress unconstitutional.10 Although Marshall began by regarding 
Fletcher v. Peck as a dispute involving the deprivation of vested property rights by the 
legislature, his application of the contract clause made the case the first of his several 
rulings on contract law that included Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), Sturges v. 
Crowninshield (1819), and Ogden v. Saunders (1827). The Yazoo opinion was the first 
time that the Marshall Court declared state legislation repugnant to the Constitution. It 
established the contract clause as a “principal weapon” in the restriction of state 
legislatures and a means by which Marshall transformed politically explosive public 
policy issues into questions of law, permitting their resolution through reference to 
common law principles and a growing body of written statutes.11 It also re-affirmed 
Marshall’s desire to separate law and politics, which he had set forth earlier in Marbury 
v. Madison when he stated that “the province of the court, is solely, to decide on the
9 C. Peter Magrath, Yazoo Law and Politics in the New Republic: The Case o f Fletcher v. Peck (New York, 
1966); Papers o f John Marshall, 7: 225-230; Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice, 81-7; and 
Newmyer, 223-26.
10 Papers o f John Marshall, 7:227.
11 Hobson, 83-85.
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rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform 
duties in which they have discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, 
by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this 
court.” 12
In Fletcher v. Peck, Marshall laid the foundations for Indian law through the 
invention of Indian title. Also known as aboriginal title, this legal concept 
acknowledged Native American tribes’ right to occupy a certain territory by virtue of 
their original inhabitancy of the land. This title recognized a right of usage. It was 
distinguished from the European notions of fee simple title, which gave absolute 
ownership to the holder, or fee tail, which also provided full ownership but restricted 
title by feudal custom to descendants of the original holder or his heirs. Marshall did not 
consider Indian title as inconsistent with fee simple ownership on the part of the state.
He reasoned that the state of Georgia “was legally seized in fee of the soil” subject only 
to the “extinguishment” of Indian title. Absolute ownership rested with the state; the 
Indians benefited from a right to occupy the land.13
Several late twentieth-century scholars, including Howard Berman, criticized 
Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck. Berman paid special attention to Justice 
Johnson’s dissent from Marshall’s majority opinion. Johnson suggested that there was 
an inconsistency in the majority’s recognition of coincident claims on land arising from 
Indian title and fee simple title. Johnson reasoned that ownership was either absolute or 
it was not. Berman argued that Marshall, “always sensitive to the political currents,”
12 Papers o f John Marshall, 6:177.
13 Papers o f John Marshall, 7:225-241.
10
ignored the claims of Native Americans as original possessors of the soil and viewed the 
issue “as a conflict between the United States and Georgia over jurisdiction of the 
lands.” Berman saw the invention of Indian title as a first step in Marshall’s 
development of a hierarchical framework of land rights in which those of Native 
Americans would be subordinate.14 Robert Williams seconded this view. He described 
Marshall’s ruling in Fletcher v. Peck as “the legal interment of the doctrine that 
American Indians possessed natural rights to the land they had occupied since time 
immemorial.” Williams also challenged Marshall’s description of lands occupied by the 
Indians as “vacant lands within the United States.”15
More recent work has cast new aspersions on the Fletcher v. Peck ruling. In his 
well-researched biography, R. Kent Newmyer viewed the case of Huidekoper’s Lessee v. 
Douglass, which saw small landholders in Pennsylvania clash with large speculative 
interests such as the Holland Land Company that included Robert Morris as a major 
stockholder, as a predecessor to Fletcher v. Peck. He suggested that in Huidekoper’s 
Lessee it was “difficult to separate Marshall’s aggressive opinion for the speculators 
from the fact that he was a speculator.” Newmyer went on to say “this is not to mention 
the even more direct connection between the Morris and Marshall families.” In 
addressing Fletcher v. Peck, Newmyer noted “as in Huidekoper’s Lessee, the Yazoo case 
pitted large land speculators against the state legislature, so that the issues involved were 
again ones in which Marshall was personally interested, and ones in which personal
14 Howard Berman, “The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States,” 
Buffalo Law Review (1977-78), 27: 640-643.
15Robert A. Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses o f Conquest, 
(New York, 1990), 308-317.
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interest may have intruded into his opinions.”16
Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) came at a time when the Supreme Court’s 
predominance in the affairs of the new nation and Marshall’s influence over the associate 
justices reached unprecedented levels. During this period, the Court rendered opinions 
in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), and 
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). Other significant cases included The Antelope (1825), Green 
v. Biddle (1821, 1823), and Cohens v. Virginia (1821).17
Johnson v. McIntosh has been regarded as the Supreme Court’s “first major 
statement on Native American land ownership” and a critical denial of “unqualified 
sovereignty” to Native Americans.18 Some scholars have argued that the Court’s ruling 
substantiated Alexis de Tocqueville’s nineteenth-century observation on Indians in 
America that “it would be impossible to destroy men with more respect for the law.”19 
Berman was especially critical of Marshall’s images of conquest and savagery. He
16 Newmyer, 221-23. G. Edward White also has provided new insights on Marshall, his legal reasoning, 
and specific rulings, but he did not refute interest-based criticisms of the chief justice. Although White 
called for a reassessment of Marshall, he placed much emphasis on Marshall’s intervention in the case of 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Fairfax appeal in which by modern standards Marshall might have been 
considered to have had a conflict of interest. Despite White’s conclusion “that the legal principles judges 
extracted and applied in constitutional cases were simply the extensions of judicial self-interest,” his 
analysis raised questions about Marshall’s code of judicial behavior. G. Edward White, “Reassessing John 
Marshall,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, 58 (2001), 680-84.
17 In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court confirmed Congressional power to establish the Second Bank of 
the United States, prohibited state legislatures from the taxation of citizens other than its own constituents, 
and introduced the doctrine of implied powers and national supremacy. In Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, Marshall ruled that the College’s charter was a contract and thus subject to the contract clause 
of the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, the steamboat case, established Congress’s plenary power to 
regulate inter-state commerce. The Antelope case resulted from an appeal asserting the United States’ 
claim to Africans aboard the privateer ship, the Antelope, which entered Savannah. In this case, Marshall 
drew extensively on tenets of international law. Green v. Biddle, which built on the contract clause ruling 
in Fletcher v. Peck, involved land claim disputes in Kentucky. The Court confirmed guarantees to holders 
that were made prior to Kentucky becoming a state. In Cohens v. Virginia the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction was confirmed, irrespective of the Eleventh Amendment.
18 Newmyer, 442; Wilcombe Washburn, Red M an’s Land/White M an’s Law (New York,1971), 66.
19 Robert Clinton et al, American Indian Law (Charlottesville, 1973), 8; Alexis de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America (New York, 2000), 410.
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attacked the chief justice’s discussion of conquest as “a language of juridical discourse 
that would potentially rationalize the process of manifest destiny and provide the 
conceptual space for the forced extinguishment of Indian lands.” Robert Williams’ 
attack was even more biting—particularly with regards to Marshall’s elaboration of the 
Doctrine of Discovery. Williams claimed “Marshall and the other justices were well 
aware of the historical paternity of this bastardized principle sired by Europe’s Law of 
Nations and legitimated by the United States Supreme Court.... [Their] acceptance of 
the Doctrine of Discovery into the United States law preserved the legacy of one 
thousand years of European racism and colonialism directed against non-Western 
peoples.” Like Berman, Williams insisted that the Johnson v. McIntosh ruling created a 
hierarchical structure in United States law whereby ‘normatively divergent peoples’ 
could be deprived of rights accorded to persons who adhered to the values and customs
9 0of European civilization.
Jill Norgren and Eric Kades also advanced virulent attacks on the Johnson v. 
McIntosh ruling. Norgren suggested that Marshall’s construction of Indian title was 
politically motivated. She noted that “tension was high in Washington over a joint 
French and Spanish expedition into South America and the expansionist activities of the 
Russians in the Northwest.” She argued that “while President Adams was mulling over
his foreign policy options, Chief Justice Marshall might have launched the myth of
21conquest as an additional statement of American independence and hegemony.” After 
tracing the events that led to Johnson v. McIntosh coming before the Supreme Court,
20 Robert A. Williams, 308-317; Berman, 655.
21 Norgren, 87-105.
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Kades referred to Marshall’s opinion as “obtuse and cryptic.” He argued that Marshall 
intentionally declined to base his ruling on relevant colonial statutes and appealed to 
customs in order to confirm European and American traditions of prohibiting the private 
purchase of Indian land. He concluded that Marshall sought to create a monopsonistic 
framework,22 whereby the federal government would be positioned as the only 
purchaser of Indian land in order to ensure expropriation of Native American lands at 
minimal cost.23
Similar to Fletcher v. Peck, neither party in Johnson v. McIntosh was Native 
American. The disputants were white Americans representing competing claims to an 
extensive tract of about fifty million acres lying between the Illinois and Wabash rivers 
in the Old Northwest. Johnson’s claim originated from conveyances by the Kaskaskia, 
Peoria, and Cahokia tribes in 1773 and the Piankashaws in 1775 to the predecessors of 
the United Illinois and Wabash Land Company. McIntosh claimed title as a result of a 
federal government grant in 1818. This case also appeared to be arranged as both parties 
were involved in speculative activities and “seemed determined to obtain a legal ruling 
whether or not the facts showed that the litigants had conflicting land claims.”24 
Proceedings were initiated in the United States’ District Court of Illinois, which decided 
in favor of McIntosh. The case was brought to the Supreme Court in 1821 on a writ of 
error and heard in February 1823.
The significance of Johnson v. McIntosh resulted from Marshall’s determination
22 A monopsony is the opposite of a monopoly; it exists when there is one buyer and many sellers and thus 
yields lower transaction prices favoring the buyer.
23 Eric Kades, “History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M ’In to sh L a w  and History 
Review , 19 (2001), 67-166.
24 Kades, 100; In his analysis Kades contends “that the parties either feigned the case or that the defendant 
and the courts declined to take even the simplest steps to verify the existence of a true controversy.”
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that Indian title was impaired. He ruled that the United States as successor to Great 
Britain had acquired title to the lands occupied by the colonies under the European 
Doctrine of Discovery, which he regarded as an accepted principle of the law of nations. 
Consequently, only the United States had the right to “extinguish” Indian title and 
convey absolute rights to the soil to individuals. Although he argued that the United 
States benefited from an exclusive right to alienate Native American land, Marshall 
emphasized that the discovery principle did not justify denial of Indian rights of 
occupancy; it “conveyed nothing more than a right to acquire the Indian title of 
occupancy.” In other words, the Doctrine of Discovery established the way European
25nations allocated the right “to extinguish Indian title” among themselves.
Marshall’s opening remarks in Johnson v. McIntosh stressed that his ruling was 
grounded in positive law, not natural law. “As the right of society to prescribe those 
rules by which property may be acquired and preserved is not, and cannot, be drawn into 
question; as the title to lands, especially, is, and must be, admitted, to depend entirely on 
the law of the nation in which they lie,” Marshall declared it was necessary to consider 
“not only those principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has 
impressed on the mind of his creature man, and which are admitted to regulate, in great
25 See Papers o f John Marshall, 9:281-4. It is interesting to note that Marshall adhered to an interpretation 
similar to that put forward by his cousin and arch ‘political’ foe, Thomas Jefferson who wrote two decades 
earlier “A society taking possession of a vacant country, and declaring they mean to occupy it, does 
therefore appropriate to themselves, as prime occupants, what was before Common. A practice introduced 
since the discovery of America authorises them to go farther, and to fix limits which they assume to 
themselves; and it seems for the common good to admit this right to a moderate and reasonable extent. If 
the country, instead of being altogether vacant, is thinly occupied by another nation, the right of the natives 
forms an exception to that of the newcomers; that is to say, these will only have a right against all other 
nations.. .the exclusive privilege of acquiring the native right by purchase or other just means. This is 
called the right of pre-emption; and is become the principle of the law of nations , fundamentally with 
respect to America.” See Julian Boyd et al., Papers o f Thomas Jefferson, 16: 407.
15
degree, the rights of civilized nations.. .but those principles also which our government
26has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule for our decision.”
Marshall placed his reasoning on the Doctrine of Discovery and Indian title 
within a framework of socially constructed justice. “However extravagant the pretension 
of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear,” Marshall 
remarked, “if the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and afterward 
sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the great 
mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be 
questioned. So too, with respect to the concomitant principle, that Indian inhabitants are 
to be considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the 
possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to 
others.” Marshall acknowledged that this approach was “opposed to natural right, and to 
the usages of civilized nations,” but he suggested that “if it be indispensable to that 
system under which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual condition 
of the two peoples, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be 
rejected by the courts of justice.”27 In Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall struggled with the 
tensions between natural law theory and increasingly accepted notions of socially 
constructed justice that shifted the focus from abstract principles to positive law set out 
in written documents, including treaties, statutes, and proclamations.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) resulted from tensions unleashed by the 
Articles of Agreement and Cession, also known as the ‘Compact of 1802,’ by which
26 Papers o f John Marshall, 9:284.
27 Ibid, 9:294.
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Georgia ceded the western lands claimed pursuant to the Treaty of Paris in 1783 to the 
federal government in exchange for the United States agreeing to obtain the 
extinguishment of Cherokee and Creek land rights. Buoyant cotton markets, an 
expanding white settler population, and the Louisiana Purchase boosted demands for 
federal action and the removal of Native Americans. To the dismay of Georgia’s white 
settlers, sporadic federal attempts toward removal achieved limited success. Moreover, 
by the early 1820s, the Cherokees showed increasing scepticism about removing 
westward and began to favor a policy of coexistence. They adopted ‘civilizing’ 
measures, intermarried with whites, introduced republican self-government, and engaged 
in large-scale agriculture and other commercial activities.
In the late 1820s, continuing delays in the federal fulfilment of the compact 
accentuated the antagonism of the growing white settler constituency toward Native 
Americans. Members of the state legislature wanted to implement a land lottery system 
and gold was discovered on Cherokee land. In 1828, the legislature introduced 
legislation annexing Cherokee lands, opening settlement under a land lottery scheme, 
denying the Cherokees their legal jurisdiction over their territory, and excluding them 
from access to state courts.28
With little hope of redress from Congress or the executive branch, which were 
firmly in the hands of President Andrew Jackson, the Cherokees retained attorneys 
William Wirt and John Sergeant to file an injunction against Georgia in the Supreme 
Court in early 1831. Framing their action as an original jurisdiction case under Article
28 For background on Cherokee Nation v. Georgia see Clinton et al, 11-15; Norgren 41-63 and 87-112.
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Ill of the Constitution, which authorized the Supreme Court to rule on controversies 
“between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects,” the 
Cherokees transformed their demands into a veritable test of their sovereignty. Wirt and 
Sergeant argued that the Georgia state laws contravened treaties between the United 
States and the Cherokees, which they also presented as evidence of the Cherokees’ status 
as a foreign nation. They claimed that the Georgia laws violated the supremacy clause 
of the Constitution prohibiting state legislation repugnant to federal statutes or treaties.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia was also remarkable because of Marshall’s 
“extraordinary departure from his policy of preserving unity on the Court.” He 
encouraged Justice Thompson’s dissenting opinion, which suggested that the Cherokees 
were a foreign nation and the Georgia laws violated federal statutes and treaties.
Marshall also backed the court reporter’s plan to publish the entire case, including the 
attorneys’ arguments, the dissenting opinion, and materials supporting the tribe’s 
claims.29
These initiatives indicated Marshall’s sympathy for the Cherokees’ plight and 
perhaps his ‘Madisonian’ recognition of the risks that powerful factions in state 
legislatures posed to the republican order and rights of minorities. In presenting the 
Court’s opinion, he noted that the Cherokees were “praying an injunction to restrain the 
state of Georgia from the execution of certain laws of that state, which.. .go directly to 
annihilate the Cherokee as a political society, and to seize for the use of the state of 
Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the United States, in
29 Hobson, 174.
30 Ibid, see especially 208-12.
18
solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.”31 His reference was to the Treaty of 
Hopewell (1785) and the Treaty of Holston (1791). The former established peace with 
the Cherokees. It placed them under the exclusive protection of the United States and 
affixed the boundaries of their lands. Under the Holston agreement, which was amended 
in 1794, “the United States solemnly guarantee[d] to the Cherokee nation all their lands 
not hereby ceded.”32
Marshall’s sensitivity to the Cherokees was especially apparent when he stated 
“if courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite 
them [could] scarcely be imagined.” Echoing Story’s reflections, he added that “a 
people, once numerous, powerful, and truly independent, found by our ancestors in the 
quiet and uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our 
superior policy, our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands, by successive treaties, 
each of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until they retain no 
more of their formerly extensive territory than is deemed necessary to their comfortable
33subsistence. To preserve this remnant, the present application is made.”
Despite his sympathy, in delivering the majority opinion, Marshall based his legal 
reasoning strictly on positive law. His comments on differences between European and 
Native American cultures were designed to explain his understanding of the Founders’ 
intentions in their framing of the commerce clause and their perceptions of Native 
Americans. “When forming this article [the commerce clause],” declared Marshall, “the 
convention considered them entirely distinct.”34
31 Reports o f the Supreme Court o f the United States, 30:10.
32 Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Treaties 1778-1883 (New York, 1973), 8-11, 29-34; Supreme Court 
Reports, 30:10.
33 Supreme Court Reports, 30:10-11 (italics added).
34 Ibid, 12-13.
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Marshall’s determination that the Cherokees were a “domestic dependent nation,” 
not a foreign state, precluded the Supreme Court from hearing their action as an original 
jurisdiction case. He indicated that the Cherokees were in “a state of pupilage;” their 
relationship with the United States “resemble[d] that of a ward to his guardian.”
Marshall considered that the commerce clause empowered Congress to develop 
government policy dealing with Native Americans, which some scholars have regarded 
as having confirmed their subordinate status in a hierarchical legal structure thus 
ensuring that they, as neither citizens nor aliens, at best had a very tenuous hold on their 
lands.35
Considered Marshall’s “ordeal by fire,” Worcester v. Georgia (1832) reaffirmed 
the aging chief justice’s commitment to the Court as a legal rather than a political 
institution. His emphasis on the Proclamation of 1763, the Constitution, treaties, and the 
writings of pre-eminent theorists on the law of nations indicated his adherence to 
positive law. As “one of Marshall’s longest and most thoroughly researched opinions,” 
Worcester v. Georgia came shortly after his wife’s death and is evidence that “he was 
still in full command of his faculties.” Marshall’s opinion was consistent with reasoning 
and principles established in earlier cases, particularly Johnson v. McIntosh and 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. Newmyer, for example, has argued that Marshall’s notion 
of domestic dependent nations linked the three cases by combining an impaired land title 
with recognition of the Cherokees’ political distinctiveness—albeit within a context of
35Supreme Court Reports, 30:16-18. John Wunder, “Retained by the People”: a History o f American 
Indians and the Bill o f Rights (New York, 1994); Wunder provides a history of these arguments.
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36diminished sovereignty over commercial and diplomatic relations.
The nullification crisis, Georgia’s execution of the Cherokee Chief Corn Tassels 
despite Marshall’s approval of a writ of error to hear an appeal of his conviction for 
murder, and mounting pressures for Indian removal heightened political tensions. In this 
regard, Worcester v. Georgia perhaps rivaled only Marbury v. Madison or the trial of 
Aaron Burr.37 Although Marshall’s legal positivism helped to shield the Court from 
criticism, delays in the enforcement of the ruling led to Samuel Worcester’s remaining in 
custody under Georgia state law for several months.
Worcester v. Georgia arose from the prosecution of Worcester, Elizur Butler and 
a handful of other whites who resided illegally in the Cherokee Nation according to state 
legislation that required non-natives to be licensed by the Governor and swear an oath of 
loyalty to the state of Georgia. In contrast to others arrested, Worcester and Butler, 
missionaries committed to the Cherokee cause and friends of Elias Boudinot who edited 
the Cherokee Phoenix, refused to accept a pardon in exchange for swearing an oath of 
loyalty. Sentenced to four years in prison, they were incarcerated and put to hard labor. 
After an unsuccessful appeal in state courts, Worcester and Butler, supported by Chief 
John Ross and other leading Cherokees intent on defending their
36 Newmyer, 447-451; Some scholars, including Norgren, have failed to identify the consistency between 
Marshall’s rulings in the Cherokee cases and argued that his reasoning in Worcester v. Georgia 
significantly departed from that in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Johnson v. McIntosh. What they have 
overlooked is that ‘conquest’ is not a ‘necessary condition’ in Marshall’s construction of the notion of 
domestic dependent nations. A domestic dependent nation presumably could result from negotiations. See 
footnote 41.
37 Reflecting perhaps the spirit of the times in Jacksonian America as well as the Chief Justice’s 
diminishing ability to achieve consensus among his colleagues and render unanimous opinions, only 
Justices Duvall, Story, and Thompson supported Marshall’s ruling in Worcester v. Georgia. Baldwin, a 
Jackson supporter, refused to condemn Georgia state legislation as a violation of federal statutes and 
authority; McClean’s ‘dissent’ concurred with the decision but raised a caveat by suggesting “If a tribe of 
Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose the power of self-government, the 
protection of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over them.”
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lands and sovereignty, appealed their conviction with the legal team of Wirt and 
Sergeant.38 Citing Cohens v. Virginia as a precedent, they argued that the Georgia laws 
encroached on federal authority and were repugnant to the Constitution. They sought to 
establish Cherokee rights by forcing a ruling on federal and state powers that required 
the incidental clarification of the Cherokees’ sovereignty. The case provided Marshall 
with wide scope for the judicial review of constitutional powers and an opportunity to 
build on his earlier decisions on Native American rights. In introducing the case, he 
asserted:
This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest 
interest. The defendant is a state, a member of the Union, which has exercised 
the powers of government over a people who deny its jurisdiction, and are under 
the protection of the United States. The plaintiff is a citizen of Vermont, 
condemned to hard labor for four years in the penitentiary of Georgia: under 
colour of an act which he alleges to be repugnant to the Constitution, laws, and 
treaties of the United States. The legislative power of a state, the controlling 
power of the Constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have 
any, the political existence of a once numerous and powerful people, the personal
O A
liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.
As a result of this broad construction, Marshall ensured that he addressed the division of 
powers and questions of political and social order, including his 
Madisonian concerns regarding the tendency of legislatures to overstep their 
jurisdictions. He also ensured that “the Cherokees would get a full hearing of their 
case.” Most likely, this was an indication of his belief that the time had arrived “to give
38 For the state appeal they acquired the services of Elisha Chester, who also assisted in the appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Without the knowledge of the Cherokees, he began working with the Jackson forces who 
sought to remove the Cherokees across the Mississippi. Paradoxically, Worcester later supported removal 
on the basis that it was the only chance for the Cherokees survival. This caused much disappointment on 
the part of Ross and other Cherokees as well as Butler who remained steadfast in support of Cherokee 
rights. See Norgren, 112-33.
39 Supreme Court Reports, 31:535.
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full indulgence to those principles of humanity and justice which ought always govern 
our conduct towards the aborigines.”40
In rendering his opinion, Marshall began by tracing the history of encounters 
between Europeans and Native Americans in an effort to uncover “the actual state of 
things.” He explored the evolution of positive law relating to European discovery and 
settlement in America in order to determine whether the process had “annulled the pre­
existing rights of its ancient possessors.” Marshall reiterated his understanding of the 
Doctrine of Discovery, which conferred a right “to acquire rights to the soil” on 
European nations only against other European nations; it did not extinguish the rights of 
Native Americans that existed from “time immemorial.”
Marshall emphasized the development of a body of positive law—the 
Proclamation of 1763 and subsequent treaties between Native Americans and Great 
Britain or the United States as successor to Great Britain. In reviewing the Treaty of 
Hopewell and the Treaty of Holston, Marshall established the contractual intentions of 
the United States and the Cherokee Nation, which he demonstrated did not include the 
divestment of the Cherokees’ rights to their ancestral lands or to self-government as a 
distinct political community. In fact, Marshall remarked that these agreements 
“explicitly [recognized] the national character of the Cherokees, and their right to self- 
government; thus guarantying their lands.” The United States assumed “the duty of 
protection” of the Cherokees and “pledged” to provide it. He reasoned that the 
relationship between the United States and the Cherokee Nation was consistent with
40 Papers o f John Marshall, 11:178-9; Hobson, 177.
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Emmerich de Vattel’s view of protectorate self-government in which the protected 
community retained jurisdiction over internal affairs while the protector assumed 
jurisdiction over diplomacy, defense, and—in the case of the United States and the 
Cherokees—the regulation of commerce.41
Marshall suggested that the Cherokees’ divestment of their rights to regulate 
commerce and the United States’ acceptance of this responsibility implied that the 
Cherokees were a distinct political community able to divest themselves of specific 
rights.42 He stated that the Federal Intercourse Act, enacted under the authority of 
Article III of the Constitution, confirmed this interpretation. Congress assumed 
responsibility for the regulation of trade “with the Indian tribes” and the latter submitted 
to this authority but retained sovereignty over their internal affairs. Similar to treaties, 
the Intercourse Act “manifestly considered] the several Indian nations as distinct 
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is 
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only 
acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States.”43
Consistent with this reasoning, Marshall ruled that the Georgia legislation was 
“repugnant to the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.” The Georgia 
laws “interfere[d] forcibly with the relations established between the United States and 
the Cherokee Nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our
41 Supreme Court Reports, 31:545,556, and 559.
42 This is an important point, which is frequently overlooked and has led some scholars to allege 
inconsistencies between Worcester v. Georgia and Marshall’s earlier Native American rights cases. In 
treaties, the Cherokee Nation consented to a diminished status under the protection of United States (and 
within the boundaries of the United States) and therefore in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia Marshall 
considered them to be a domestic dependent nation, not a foreign nation. In both cases, he drew on similar 
evidence, treaties, but in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia he could not consider the Cherokees’ complaint 
because of the Constitution and their protectorate status— to which they themselves had consented.
43 Ibid, 556.
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Constitution, [was] committed exclusively to the government of the Union.” He 
concluded by returning to the fate of Worcester, reaffirming the positivist foundations of 
his ruling. “The judgement of the superior court for the county of Gwinnet, in the state 
of Georgia, condemning Samuel A. Worcester to hard labor in the penitentiary of the 
state of Georgia, for four years, was pronounced by that court under a law which is void, 
as being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States and ought, 
therefore, to be reversed and annulled.”44
44 Ibid.
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CHAPTER m  
“OLD HUGO GROTIUS” TO VATTEL
Marshall’s rulings in these Native American rights cases reveal his emphasis on 
positive law and socially constructed justice, themes advanced by Renaissance 
Humanists and Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. In contrast to natural law, positive law 
was inseparable from history, the evolution—as Marshall put it—of the “actual state of 
things.” For him, positive law took precedence over “principles of abstract justice.” 
Justice was socially constructed; it was a social or artificial virtue linked to a specific 
context.45
The influence of Renaissance Humanism and the Scottish Enlightenment on the 
chief justice is understandable. Marshall was schooled in Virginia where the chef- 
d ’oeuvres of Hugo Grotius, Samuel Puffendorf, and the leading thinkers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment were incorporated in the legal curriculum. These works also were held in 
Virginian libraries. Undoubtedly, Marshall’s affinity for positivist doctrines was 
reinforced by his duties as Minister to France, his experience as Secretary of State, and 
his interest in contemporary events—the “political essays of the day.”46 His decisions on 
Native Americans are a unique lens through which to examine the influence of
45 Supreme Court Reports, 31:545; Papers o f John Marshall, 9:284.
46 William Hamilton Bryson, Census o f Law Books in Colonial Virginia (Charlottesville, 1978) and Legal 
Education in Virginia (Charlottesville, 1982). Bryson showed that Pufendorf s work ranked as one of the 
most commonly-held legal books in libraries at this time. Bryson also noted the reliance of George Wythe 
on Blackstone’s Commentaries, undoubtedly the first text legal text with which Marshall was familiar as 
his father procured him a copy when he was seventeen years old. See Newmyer, 77. In “The Events of My 
Life” Marshall suggested that in his eighteenth year he devoted more time “to the political essays of the 
day”— indeed more than to “the classics or to Blackstone.” John Marshall, “The Events o f my Life”: an 
Autobiographical Sketch (Ann Arbor, 2001), 15.
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Renaissance Humanism and the Scottish Enlightenment on his legal reasoning and 
exercise of judicial discretion.
i) The Moral Scientists
Hugo Grotius, the founder of a new ‘science of morality’ based on “man’s 
impelling desire for society” and the “Dictates of a right and sound Judgment,” was 
highly regarded by Marshall.47 When Henry Wheaton published A Digest o f the 
Decisions o f the Supreme Court o f the United States in 1821, Marshall commended him 
on his treatment of Grotius. “Old Hugo Grotius is indebted to you for your defence of 
him & his quotations,” wrote Marshall. “You have raised him in my estimation to the 
rank he deserves.”48 Although copies of The Rights o f War and Peace were circulating 
in Virginia, Marshall’s familiarity with Grotius likely stemmed from Thomas 
Rutherford’s summary of his work, which Marshall often cited. Rutherford’s volume 
was one of the key law books in Marshall’s library.49
The influence of Grotius may explain Marshall’s references to clashes between 
reason and passion as well as the consistency of a number of his major opinions with 
basic Grotian principles. Marshall’s dissent in Ogden v. Saunders (1827), which 
addressed the constitutionality of a New York bankruptcy law and was his only dissent 
in a constitutional case, advanced Grotius’s premise that obligations did not originate in 
civil law but that the right to the fulfilment of contracts—the right to receive what was 
due—was “brought by individuals with them into society.” Marshall argued that 
obligations resulting from man’s “social faculty” and his capacity for reason and
47 Samuel Pufendorf, On the Natural State o f Men (New York, 1990), ed. Michael Seidler, 8-16; Hugo 
Grotius, The Rights o f War and Peace (London, 1738), 18.
48 Papers o f John Marshall, 9:148.
49 Rudko, 25-26;
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judgment existed in a state of nature.50 Irrespective of man’s level of civilization, he had 
obligations and rights.
Marshall’s discussion of Native American civilization also reflected Grotian 
thought. In addressing the origins of property, Grotius described “the original 
inhabitants of America” as people in a state of civilization without property. “Dominion 
or Desmesne” did not exist; man benefited only from a “Universal right” to what was 
required for subsistence. “Men but persisted in their primitive simplicity, or lived 
together in perfect Charity,” wrote Grotius. “Some People in America.. .by the 
extraordinary Simplicity of their Manners, without the least Inconvenience [have] 
observed the same Method of Living for many Ages.”51 According to Grotius, if 
property did not exist in this early stage of civilization, rights to property according to 
European definitions did not exist. Rights were merely to occupancy or usage, “to enjoy 
in common” what was necessary for survival. This right was not necessarily inconsistent 
with absolute European property rights being vested in the state, a position that Marshall 
adopted in Fletcher v. Peck and Johnson v. McIntosh.
Grotius argued that the allocation of property not claimed on the “original 
division” out of a state of nature —and America fell within this category—required the 
exercise of “a double right of possession, the one Universal, and the other Particular, the 
former.. .done by the whole People.. .for a Public Advantage; the latter by private and 
particular Persons., .a Tenure rather assigned to them, than taken and held by them by 
their own Will or Choice.” This reasoning provided the foundation for the European
59 Hobson notes that although Marshall did not specifically refer to Grotius in this opinion, he undoubtedly 
had him in mind.
51 Grotius, 26.
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Doctrine of Discovery, which was central to Marshall’s rulings. According to Grotius’ 
Universal title, the state became the first possessor and benefited from absolute title.
Only when absolute title had been transferred by the state to individuals could they 
transfer it to other parties. Indians had not benefited from such a transfer. Although 
they could transfer the title that they had to other individuals—as Marshall indicated in 
Johnson v. McIntosh—it would be a title constructed according to their institutions and 
“Manners.” It would not be the absolute title that resided in the state. “The title of the 
crown,” reasoned Marshall, “could be acquired only by a conveyance from the crown. If 
an individual might extinguish the Indian title, for his own benefit, or, in other words 
purchase it, still, he could acquire only that title.”52
Samuel Pufendorf built on Grotius’s science of morality. Through his impact on 
the Scottish Enlightenment, in part as a result of Gershom Carmichael’s annotated 
edition of De officio that served as a text in moral philosophy at the University of 
Glasgow and was read by Hume and Smith, Pufendorf’s contemporary influence was 
expanded.53 As one of the twelve most popular law books in Revolutionary Virginia, 
Pufendorf s Law o f Nature and Nations had a significant influence on the “state’s 
leading sons,” including Marshall.54
Pufendorf argued that morality was basically a human creation assisted in part by 
man’s deductions from nature. He suggested that a fundamental law of nature was that 
man should live sociably. Man’s desire to escape the misery of a state of nature led him 
to initiate a progressive process of enculturation; through the development of kinship and
52 Papers o f John Marshall, 9: 281-4.
53 Seidler, 16.
54 Bryson, Census o f Law Books, xvii.
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social relationships, he advanced from a pre-cultural state to a pre-civil state. Pufendorf 
believed that by securing additional benefits of sociability through exchange and rules 
that sanctioned bonds between humans and protected their property, man could advance 
to a civil state.
Pufendorf’s vision of civilizing progress placed morality and law on center stage 
and put a new emphasis on obligation and duty. “To do things enjoined by Law is a 
Matter of Duty,” concluded Pufendorf. “Obligation” became “a moral operative Quality, 
by which a Man [was] bound to perform.”55 He stressed that laws and customs 
recognized in civil states contributed to improvement in the human condition. “Men’s 
standards of living [could be] significantly furthered by states,” wrote Pufendorf, 
because “citizens [could] securely devote themselves to their work without hindrance 
and be more assured about reaping the fruits of their industry.”56 As man progressed 
through various levels of civilizing progress, the nature of his duties and obligations 
reflected more varied and complex interactions.
As civil states proliferated, customs and rules—the law of nations—were 
required to govern relations between them. Pufendorf recognized the importance of 
boundaries and the principle of usucapion in defining rights, including property rights 
derived from occupancy.58 He noted that “whoever has continued the possession of a
55 Samuel Pufendorf, O f the Law o f Nature and Nations (London, 1729), 59,60.
56Seidler, 117.
57 Ibid, 39-40.
58 Usucapio was a term from Roman law for the mode of acquiring property by possession in good faith 
over a certain period of time. Arthur English, A Dictionary o f Words and Phrases Used in Ancient and 
Modern Law (Littleton, Col., 1987); Pufendorf defined Usucapio and Prescriptio in the following 
passage: “It belongs to our present Design to enquire likewise concerning that Method of Acquisition, by 
which he who hath gotten Possession of what was really another’s, by just Title and with honest Intentions, 
and hath also held it for a considerable time without being disturbed or opposed, obtains the full Property 
of the thing thus possessed, so as to extinguish all the Rights and legal Claim of the former Owner. This 
the Roman Law terms Usucapio, because the Thing is, as it were, taken and acquired by long Use or 
Possession. The Word Prescriptio in the Sense of the same Law imports strictly, that Plea, Demur, or
30
thing.. .has something ‘added’ to him which he has thus far lacked. And he to whom the 
‘law’ has added something can be said to have acquired it.” Pufendorf recognized the 
principle of usucapion as essential to orderly relations between civil states. It served “to 
prevent states from being disturbed by uncertain and unsettled dominion” and to grant to 
“possessors over a long period, who deserve great favour, an ultimate security in their 
holding.” Pufendorf also sought to define possession through effective land use. He 
reasoned that “we are said to have occupied a thing only when we actually take 
possession of it... [I]t is the customary thing that occupancy o f.. .land [be effected] by the 
feet, along with the intention of cultivating it and of establishing boundaries either exact 
or with some latitude.59
Marshall’s familiarity with Pufendorf was evident from the references to him in 
several major cases including the post-Revolutionary War British debt case of Ware v. 
Hylton, the only case that Marshall argued before the Supreme Court.60 In his rulings on 
Native American rights, Marshall reasoned on principles advanced by the seventeenth- 
century scholar. In Fletcher v. Peck, Marshall’s classification of “a grant as a contract,” 
was consistent with Pufendorf s interpretation of obligation and “faith between 
parties.”61 Marshall’s elaboration of Indian title conformed to Pufendorf’s restatement 
of Grotius’s Doctrine of Discovery, which established the state as the absolute possessor 
of lands and gave it the exclusive right to extinguish native title. In discussing discovery 
and settlement—what he referred to as “Occupancy in general”—Pufendorf noted “we 
are farther to observe, that it confers on the Community, as such, a Dominion over all
Exception, by which the Person thus in Possession invalidates the Claim of the first Possessor. Pufendorf, 
438-40
59 Ibid
60 Papers of John Marshall, 5:295-311.
61 Hobson, 86; Pufendorf, 266-7.
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things contained within the Tract which they possess.” Pufendorf affirmed that absolute
title resided in the discovering state and addressed the New World saying “the same Rule
62may, in our Judgment, be extended to such desolate Islands as lie in any Sea.”
In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall concurred with Pufendorf on prescription and 
usucapion. The chief justice declared that Native Americans were possessors of the soil 
from “time immemorial” and had “an unquestionable, and heretofore, unquestioned, 
right to the lands they occupy until that right shall be extinguished.” Echoing Pufendorf, 
Marshall asserted that “it is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants 
of either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over 
inhabitants of the other, or over lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by 
the other should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the 
pre-existing rights of its ancient possessors.” Marshall questioned whether 
“adventurers, by sailing along the coast and occasionally landing on it, acquire[d] for the 
several governments to whom they belonged, or by whom they were commissioned, a 
rightful property in the soil from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful dominion over the 
numerous people who occupied it.” He asked whether “nature, or the great Creator of all 
things, conferred these rights over hunters and fishermen, on agriculturists and 
manufacturers.” By pursuing this line of inquiry and noting that Native Americans had 
not consented to the extinguishment of their internal sovereignty or land rights, Marshall 
emphasized the issues upon which Pufendorf had focused, boundaries and usage.64 
Addressing the Treaty of Hopewell, Marshall declared:
Is it reasonable to suppose, that the Indians, who could not write, and most
62 Pufendorf, 387.
63 Supreme Court Reports, 31:556.
64 Pufendorf, 439.
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probably could not read, who certainly were not critical judges of our language, 
should distinguish the word “allotted” from the words “marked out.” The actual 
subject of contract was the dividing line between the two nations, and their 
attention may very well be supposed to have been confined to that subject.. .So 
with respect to “hunting grounds.” Hunting was at that time the principal 
occupation of the Indians, and their land was more used for that purpose than for 
any other. It could not, however, be supposed, that any intention existed of 
restricting the full use of the lands they reserved.
This broad interpretation of Pufendorf’s principle of usage undermines criticisms that
Marshall applied judicial discretion in favor of non-Native American interests.
Marshall recognized the Cherokees’ claim to their lands by usage, which he defined in
terms of Native American rather than European practices. A narrow interpretation of
Pufendorf s usage principle would have vested Native Americans with rights only for
their actual usage, which at the time of discovery was confined to hunting. Marshall’s
broad interpretation in Worcester v. Georgia took into account that activities might
change over time. In recognizing.the Cherokees’ rights, Marshall stated that “it could
not be a matter of concern [to the United States], whether their [the Cherokees’] whole
territory was devoted to hunting grounds, or whether an occasional village, and an
occasional corn field, interrupted, and gave some variety to the scene.”65
Cornelius van Bynkershoek, recognized as a great “positivist” among the
continental jurists, forged a critical link between Pufendorf and Emmerich de Vattel.66
Stressing treaties, proclamations of sovereign authorities, and tacit agreements between
nations, Bynkershoek focused on customary usage, which he called the “mistress of the
65 Supreme Court Reports, 31:550-60.
66 L. C. Green and Olive P. Dickson, The Law o f Nations and the New World (Edmonton, 1989), 94-100; 
Henry Wheaton, Elements o f International Law (Philadelphia, 1846),32-4. Wheaton provided a 
nineteenth-century summary of Bynkershoek’s contribution noting that “Bynkershoek derives the law of 
nations from reason and usage (ex ratione et usu), and founds usage on the evidence of treaties and 
ordinances (pacta et edicta), with the comparison of examples frequently recurring.
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law of nations.”67 Through emphasis on consent between civil states, he took notions of 
duty and obligation, previously applied to individuals, and extended them to nations. 
Some eighteenth and nineteenth century observers such as James Wilson understood the 
law of nations simply as the law of nature applied to civil states. Nations had the right, 
indeed duty, of self-preservation. They also were obliged to respect agreements among 
themselves in order to sustain a community of nations just as individuals were obligated 
to abide by rules of sociability.68
Marshall referred to Bynkershoek in several major opinions. In Schooner 
Exchange v. McFadon and Greetham (1812), a “very delicate case” in which American 
citizens claimed ownership of a schooner refitted as a warship by the French when it 
entered the port of Baltimore, Marshall called Bynkershoek a “a jurist of great 
reputation.”69 In the Neireide (1815), another case involving international law in which 
a Spanish national contested the seizure of his goods during the War of 
1812, Marshall drew at length on Bynkershoek’s interpretations of the law of nations and
67 Cornelius van Bynkershoek, Quaestionum Juris Publici Libri Duo (New York, 1930) translated by 
Tenney Frank, xlii.
68 James Wilson, The Works o f James Wilson, ed. Robert Green McCloskey, 1:148-55. For Wilson, a 
difference between a nation’s exercise of the right of self-preservation under the law of nature and that of 
an individual was that the nation required the consent of the people in whom sovereign authority 
ultimately resided. “By the voluntary act of the individuals forming the nation, the nation was called into 
existence: they who bind, can also untie: by the voluntary act therefore, of the individuals forming the 
nation, the nation may be reduced to its original nothing.”
69 Papers o f John Marshall, 7:313.
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70stated “the Court is bound by the law  o f  nations, w hich is part o f  the law  o f  the land.”
In Brown v. United States (1814), Marshall referred to Bynkershoek in establishing 
rights of creditors and debtors.
Marshall’s decisions on Native American rights emphasized three principles 
endorsed by Bynkershoek—the right of nations to their self-preservation, the primacy of 
proclamations, treaties, and agreements in international law, and the importance of 
consent. In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall affirmed that “the controlling power of the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have any, the political 
existence of a once numerous and powerful people.. .are all involved in the subject now 
to be considered.” He confirmed the legitimacy of treaties, which “explicitly” 
recognized the “national character of the Cherokees, and their right of self- 
government.”71 In Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall recognized the Doctrine of Discovery 
as a tacit agreement or customary practice between the civilized states of Europe, which 
also served as evidence of their consent. Customary usage implied consent. “Discovery 
gave title.. .it was a right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which
72all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented.”
The pre-eminence that Marshall accorded proclamations, treaties, and 
agreements, especially apparent in his last two cases on Native American rights, 
reflected his commitment to positive law. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall 
partially based his ruling rejecting the status of the Cherokees as a foreign nation on
70 Papers o f John Marshall, 8:5,76; Benjamin Munn Ziegler, The International Law o f John Marshall 
(Chapel Hill, 1939), 12; Ziegler pointed out that in fact Marshall’s “adjudications on international law 
were three times more numerous than those involving questions of constitutional law...between 1801 and 
the time of Marshall’s death in 1835, there were 1215 cases decided. Of these there were 62 involving 
constitutional questions, and 195 involving questions o f international law or in some way affecting 
international relations.
71 Supreme Court Reports, 31:556.
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treaties to which the tribe had given its consent. In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall 
invoked the Proclamation of 1763, the Treaty of Hopewell, and the Treaty of Holston— 
agreements to which Great Britain and the United States as its successor had assented— 
as the basis for his opinion on the Cherokees’ rights to their land and to self-government. 
Marshall made it clear that in his view the Constitution confirmed the status of treaties.
In Worcester v. Georgia, he asserted “the Constitution, by declaring the treaties already 
made, as well as those to be made, to be the law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned 
the previous treaties with the Indian nations.”
ii) The Scots
In dealing with Native American land claims and human rights cases such as The 
Antelope, Marshall wrestled with issues that preoccupied the leading thinkers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Similar to the ‘moral scientists,’ these philosophers sought to 
reconcile rights based on natural law theory with positive laws reflecting the “moral life 
and moral institutions of humanity in social and historical terms.” They developed 
notions of subjective or adventitious rights and moral agency, which they believed 
shaped the evolution of man’s sociability. The Scots, especially Hume and Smith, 
viewed history as “essential to moral theory, because moral consciousness, moral 
judgement, and moral institutions were formed by the accommodations reached at a 
given stage of society and in a given type of government.”74
For Hume, morality reflected man’s existence in society and the values prevailing 
at a specific moment. Justice was a social virtue and depended on public utility or
72 Papers o f John Marshall, 9:279-301.
73 Supreme Court Reports, 31:559.
74 Haakonssen, Natural Law, 5-7. LIBRARY
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“sympathy” with the advantage or general interest of society. He suggested that there 
was no “natural” connection between the general interest and respect for the rules of 
justice; they became connected only through “artificial convention,” the adoption of a 
“social value system.” Justice did not originate in a state of nature except in that it 
reflected man’s natural sociability. Social institutions, including property and contracts, 
were “no more than practices” introduced in accordance with “the particular state and 
condition” in which men found themselves. Hume recognized, however, that justice was 
essential to the preservation of society itself. He stressed that “human nature cannot, by 
any means, subsist without the association of individuals; and that association never 
could have place were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, 
confusion, the war of all against all are the necessary consequences of such a licentious 
conduct.” 75
Hume’s influence may have helped to distance the chief justice’s opinions from 
natural rights theory. In Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall stated “as the right of society to 
prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired and preserved is not, and 
cannot, be drawn into question; as the title to lands, especially, is, and must be, admitted, 
to depend entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie; it will be necessary, in 
pursuing this inquiry, to examine, not simply those principles of abstract justice.. .but 
those principles also which our own government has adopted in the particular case, and 
given us the rule for our decision.” Marshall’s confirmation of the European Doctrine of 
Discovery also was consistent with Hume’s contextual approach. “If the principle has
75 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles o f Morals, ed. Charles W. Hendel, (New York, 
1957) 14-15-19; 35. Haakonssen, The Science o f a Legislator (Cambridge, 1981), 10, 43.
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been asserted in the first instance, and afterward sustained; if a country has been 
acquired under it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it,” 
wrote Marshall, “it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.” This theme 
was evident again in his opinion on America’s claim of absolute title to Native American 
lands. “The British government, which was then our government, and whose rights have 
passed to the United States” noted Marshall, “asserted a title to all the lands occupied by 
the Indians.. .The title to a vast portion of the lands we now hold originates in them. It is 
not for the courts of this country to question the validity of this title, or to sustain one 
which is incompatible with it.” Marshall reasoned that the title had been socially 
constructed at a certain moment; social conduct had been fashioned accordingly; land 
titles could not be questioned, nor the rules undone.
Marshall’s Native American rights opinions were also fashioned in accordance 
with Hume’s definition of property. Hume argued that property was “anything which it 
is lawful for [a man], and for him alone, to use.” He indicated that property could be 
distinguished by reference “to statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, and a hundred 
other circumstances—some of which are constant and inflexible, some variable and
77arbitrary.” Marshall adopted this approach, grounding his opinions in positive law— 
the Constitution, treaties, proclamations, precedents, and customs including practices 
legitimated by the emerging law of nations.
It is also difficult to divorce Marshall’s jurisprudence from the doctrines of Adam 
Smith. Smith reinforced the idea of justice as a social virtue through his development of
76 Papers o f  John Marshall, 9:279-301.
77 Hume, 28.
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the “impartial spectator.” Justice was dependent on “the very existence of community” 
and the impartial spectator extended sympathy in accordance with a given social context. 
Smith emphasized the historical development of adventitious rights and advanced a view 
of ‘four stages of civilization,’ which influenced late eighteenth century and early 
nineteenth century thought.78
According to Smith, although rights were key to man’s living socially, they were 
not “pre-social moral equipment” that existed in a state of nature. They reflected the 
state of society, which depended on the evolution of civilization or moral progress.
Smith was careful to distinguish between natural and adventitious rights. The former 
related to private law and concerned the individual’s personal integrity and reputation; 
the latter emerged with the advancement of civilization and pertained to property, 
family, and public or municipal law. Smith believed that adventitious rights had a 
history and could “only be explained in their historical context.”79
Smith’s sympathy mechanism—the impartial spectator—determined how justice 
was established, how things were perceived or looked upon. Smith stressed that the 
nature and complexity of law changed according to man’s civilizing progress such that 
the history of the law was embedded in “the present state of the law.” In elaborating the 
four stages of civilization—“the age of hunters, the age of shepherds, the age of 
agriculture, and the age of commerce”—Smith argued that the concept of property was
78 Samuel Stanhope Smith, 59; In his work that Marshall owned, he addressed Adam Smith’s concept of 
the impartial spectator and the Scottish Enlightenment concern with moral sentiments. He stated “...the 
perceptions of the moral sense, and the sanctions of its conscience, which is only the moral sense speaking 
with authority, have an ulterior view to a law, and to a Supreme Judge, to which each man, in his calm and 
reflecting moments, feels himself amenable...These sentiments are essentially connected with the 
perceptions of duty and obligation, which peculiarly belong to the moral sense.
79 Charles L. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1999), 228; 
Haakonssen, Science, 100-102.
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inherently related to the “essential activities” of society. In the ages of hunters and 
shepherds, property was confined to a person’s immediate possessions such as clothing 
and tools for hunting or herding. With the development of agriculture, the notion of
O A
property was extended to land, “the greatest extension it has undergone.” According to 
Smith, property rights defined in terms of European agricultural and commercial 
development did not yet exist in Native American hunter societies. Rights that existed 
were those of occupancy, usage for the predominant activities of hunting and fishing.
Marshall’s discourse on savagery and his comments on differences between 
European and Native American civilizations suggest that he shared Smith’s views on 
civilizing progress. Marshall, however, did not limit Native American rights to their 
“essential activities” or, as seen in discussing Pufendorf, their actual usage. Indeed, in 
Johnson v. McIntosh—almost a decade before Worcester v. Georgia—Marshall was 
careful not to restrict Native Americans’ ‘internal’ political sovereignty, particularly with 
regard to their ability to develop their own laws and institutions, including property. In 
an often overlooked passage, he stated:
Admitting to their [Native Americans’] power to change their laws or 
usages, so far as to allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from 
the common stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is part of their territory, and is 
held under them, by a title dependent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy 
from their will; and, if they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition 
of the land, the courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of 
the title. The person who purchases lands from Indians, within their territory, 
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds 
their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant 
we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside [their decision].81
In sharp contrast to criticisms of him, Marshall recognized Native American internal
80 Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, LJ(A) i, 53; Haakonssen, Science, 162.
81 Papers o f John Marshall, 9 281-4.
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political sovereignty. Far from seeking to stifle Native American initiative or wrest their 
lands, Marshall gave America’s original inhabitants wide rein to develop their 
communities through their own laws and institutions.82 The constraints that he 
specifically imposed on them related to the United States’ right to extinguish Indian title 
and the Cherokees’ protectorate status with regard to diplomatic and commercial 
relations.
Similar to other late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Americans, Marshall 
was influenced by the Scottish Common Sense philosophy championed by Thomas Reid, 
Dugald Stewart, and their followers.84 Their empiricist approach incorporated notions of 
agency and duty within a framework of socially constructed justice. The “end of law” 
was the protection of citizens in “all that they may lawfully do, or possess, or demand.” 
Although the general right to property was a natural right, individuals “acquire[d] the 
right to a specific piece of property.” Man was obliged to respect rights of others; 
individual claims were not to conflict with the common good but contribute to it. This 
approach “heavily circumscribed” rights to property and underpinned Reid’s proposition
82 Marshall’s view of Native Americans and their property rights was much more favorable than that 
advanced by William Robertson whose History o f America, adopted a Smithian approach to civilizing 
progress but showed little appreciation of Native American culture or political order. Robertson stated “In 
every inquiry concerning the operations of men when united together in society, the first object of attention 
should be their mode of subsistence. Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policy must be different. 
The institutions suited to the ideas and exigences of tribes, which subsist chiefly by fishing or hunting, and 
which have as yet acquired but an imperfect conception of any species of property, will be much more 
simple than those which must take place when the earth is cultivated with regular industry, and a right of 
property, not only in its productions, but in the soil itself, is completely ascertained...While the idea of 
property is unknown, or incompletely conceived.. .while the spontaneous productions of the earth, as well 
as the fruits of industry, are considered as belonging to the public stock... where the right of separate and 
exclusive possession is not introduced, the great object of law and jurisdiction [property itself] does not 
exist.” William Robertson, The Work of William Robertson, Volume 5, History o f America, (Edinburgh, 
1851) 309,324.
83 Protectorate status, a term used by Vattel, is discussed below.
84 James Wilson, in particular, has been considered instrumental in disseminating this philosophy. 
Educators, including Samuel Stanhope Smith, who occupied influential academic positions in the new 
nation’s colleges also played important roles. With respect to Marshall, scholars have seen links through 
Archibald Campbell and James Thomson. James Wilson, The Works o f James Wilson; Newmyer, 7.
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that “we may occupy only such parts of nature as are necessary for the satisfaction of the 
needs and wants of ourselves and those dependent upon us, and we may do so provided 
that we do not injure others in their similar rights.”85 Reid’s application of the principles 
of obligation and duty were especially important. Morally, he saw no difference 
between “a stated contractual obligation” and one that was “tacitly implied.” A 
contract—written or tacitly implied—created an “office,” which carried obligations.
In his discussion of moral agency, Reid emphasized the ability to judge 
reasonably and morally what was willed. He viewed “proper instruction and practice” 
as essential for the development of the moral faculty. Children or persons with mental 
defects, temporary or permanent, were typical of people who might fall into a category 
of deficient agency—individuals who could be regarded as incompetent to judge what 
they willed.86
In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall’s recognition of the Cherokee as a “people 
distinct from others,” a “nation” that had not surrendered the right of self-government, 
was consistent with Reid’s principle that obligations resulting from an implied contract 
were equivalent to those of a written contract. Marshall reasoned that a contractual 
relationship existed between the Cherokees and the United States and deemed it essential 
that the intentions of the contracting parties be considered. Marshall cited the 
Constitution as evidence of an implied relationship between nations. “The Constitution, 
by declaring treaties already made, to be the supreme law of the land,” wrote Marshall, 
“has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with Indian nations, and consequently
85 Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, ed. Timothy Duggan, (Chicago, 1970), 238-9,247;
Haakonssen, Natural Law, 205-6. These views underpinned colonists’ arguments that Native American 
land ownership should be limited to a quantity of land required for subsistence. Extensive hunting grounds 
infringed on the colonists’ rights. Such arguments were adopted by the Connecticut authorities in the 
lengthy case of The Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1704-1772).
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admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words 
‘treaty’ and ‘nation’ are words of our own language, selected by ourselves, having each a 
definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have 
applied them to the other nations of the earth.”87
The notion of pupilage or wardship that Marshall elaborated in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, however, was inconsistent with Reid’s definition of deficient agency. 
Marshall regarded Native Americans as having the capacity to reason and judge their 
interests. He stressed that Native American rights to their lands could not be 
extinguished except by their “voluntary cession” to the government, a clear indication 
that he recognized their decision-making capacity. In Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall 
noted that Native Americans were “capable of making treaties” and exercising their the 
right to self-government.88 These remarks contradict late twentieth-century criticisms of 
Marshall, which linked his notion of pupilage to Francisco Vitoria.89 Although 
Marshall’s view of history embodied different stages of civilization, in contrast to 
Vitoria he never questioned the capacity of Native Americans to reason. The state of
Keith Lehrer, Thomas Reid (London, 1989), 136; Haakonssen, Natural Law, 190-1.
87 Supreme Court Reports, 31, 559-60.
88 Supreme Court Reports, 30:17; 31:559.
89 Robert Clinton, Nell Jessup, and Monroe Price advanced the idea that Marshall “imparted” Vitoria’s 
views into American law. They quoted Vitoria: “Although the aborigines in question are...not wholly 
unintelligent, yet they are little short of that condition, and so are unfit to found or administer a lawful 
State up to the standard required by human and civil claims. It might, therefore, be maintained that in their 
own interests the sovereigns of Spain might undertake the administration of their country, providing them 
with prefects and governors for their towns, and might even give them new lords, so long as this was 
clearly for their benefit. I say there would be some force in this contention; for if they were all wanting in 
intelligence, there is no doubt that this would not only be a permissible, but also a highly proper, course to 
take; nay, our sovereigns would be bound to take it, just as if the natives were infants. The same principle 
seems to apply here to them as to people of defective intelligence; and indeed they are no whit better or 
little better than such so far as self-government is concerned, or even wild beasts, for their food is not more 
pleasant and hardly better than that of wild beasts. Therefore their governance should be entrusted to 
people of intelligence. See Robert Clinton et al, American Indian Law (Charlottesville, 1973),15-16.
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pupilage he had in mind is better understood with reference to the doctrines of Vattel and 
the developing law of nations.
iii) Vattel
Peter and Nicholas Onuf have remarked that among works on international law, 
Vattel’s Law o f Nations was “unrivaled” in terms of its “influence on the American 
founders.” Marshall proved to be no different from them. Early in his career, he 
referred to Vattel in the British debt case, Ware v. Hylton. As Minister to France, he 
cited the Law o f Nations in a memorial to Talleyrand. When Marshall was Secretary of 
State, Vattel’s treatise was the “authoritative text” for the Department of State.90
In view of the many cases on international law that came before the Supreme 
Court and the fact that Marshall’s tenure as chief justice coincided with the “second 
stage in the evolution of the modem law of nations” in which Vattel was the most 
influential figure, the continental jurist was a logical authority for Marshall. He used 
Vattel as a reference on the rules of diplomatic immunity in Schooner Exchange v. 
McFadon and Greetham when he exempted the ‘American’ vessel that had been refitted 
as a French warship from domestic law. In dissenting from the majority in The Venus, 
Marshall quoted Vattel on the rights of “perpetual inhabitants'’ and citizens residing in 
foreign countries in times of peace. In his “Friend of the Constitution” essays following 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall demonstrated his mastery of Vattel by assailing 
Hampden’s interpretation of his writings. Marshall, having reflected on Vattel’s
90 Papers o f John Marshall, 1:39. Newmyer, 78, notes the influence of both Grotius and Vattel, referring 
to the emerging law of nations as “a moral enterprise” infused with Enlightenment thinking. He suggests 
that “without knowing it, the young men who grew up in Virginia, who read law with george Wythe, 
shared in the Enlightenment belief that human rationality might control human destiny. Ziegler, 
International Law, 9, 20; Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of 
Nations in the Age o f Revolutions, 1776-1814 (Madison, 1993), 11; Rudko, Marshall and International 
Law, 4.
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doctrines and their applicability to the United States, turned the authority of the 
continental jurist against his adversary.
Vattel provided at least two supporting arguments for Marshall’s rulings on 
occupancy title. The first was contained in his discussion of “inhabitants,” which 
Marshall cited at length in The Venus. Vattel argued that a distinct class of individuals, 
which he referred to as inhabitants, could be justified in a civilized state. Indeed, he 
suggested that there might be a class of individuals who could be regarded as “perpetual 
inhabitants,” persons permitted to reside in perpetuity within a civilized state but denied 
full citizenship. Vattel considered that such individuals might be granted only the 
benefits that law or custom accorded them. They represented “a kind of inferior 
order.. .united to the society without participating in all its advantages.” According to 
Vattel, the sovereign authority had discretion concerning the rights that might be 
bestowed on these inhabitants. If custom dictated their exclusion from full rights to 
property, the state could enact laws to this effect.
The second argument resulted from Vattel’s elaboration of the Doctrine of 
Discovery, which he applied differentially to vacant and non-vacant lands. In the case 
of the former, Vattel noted that “a nation [that] finds a country uninhabited, and without 
an owner, may lawfully take possession of it; and after it has sufficiently made known its 
will in this respect, it cannot be deprived of it by another nation.” Probably with the 
Americas in mind, Vattel added “if at the same time two or more nations discover and 
take possession of an island or other desert land without an owner, they ought to agree
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among themselves, and make an equitable partition; but, if they cannot agree, each will 
have right of empire and the domain in the parts in which they first settled.” Vattel’s 
vision was clearly Eurocentric and designed to promote a law of nations that reflected 
the European balance of power, commercial interests, and ‘civilized’ values.
With regard to non-vacant lands, Vattel adopted the principle of effective land 
use. Building on premises of usage established by Pufendorf, Vattel stipulated that the 
law of nations did not “acknowledge the property and sovereignty of a nation” unless it 
formed settlements or made “actual use” of discovered lands. Vattel focused on the case 
of “the original inhabitants of America.” He remarked that Native Americans occupied 
vast expanses of land at a time when the European population was growing rapidly and 
required new land. Vattel asked whether “a nation may lawfully take possession of some 
part of a vast country, in which there are none but erratic nations whose scanty 
population is incapable of occupying the whole.” Displaying an Old World bias, Vattel 
responded to his own query:
We have already observed in establishing the obligation to cultivate the earth, 
that those nations [Native American tribes] cannot exclusively appropriate to 
themselves more land than they have occasion for, or more than they are able to 
settle and cultivate. Their unsettled habitation in those immense regions cannot 
be accounted a true and legal possession; and the people of Europe, too closely 
pent up at home, finding land of which the savages stood in no particular need, 
and of which they made no actual and constant use, were lawfully entitled to take 
possession of it and settle it with colonies. The earth.. .belongs to mankind in 
general and was designed to furnish them with subsistence: if each nation had, 
from the beginning appropriated to itself a vast country, that people might live by 
hunting and fishing, and wild fruits, our globe would not be sufficient to maintain 
a tenth part of its present inhabitants. We therefore do not deviate to confining 
the Indians within narrower limits.91
91 Vattel, 100
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It is noteworthy—especially in light of the criticisms of him by Berman, 
Williams, Norgren, and others—that Marshall never embraced this Vattelian argument. 
Despite his reference to efficient land use in Johnson v. McIntosh when he mused “to 
leave them [Native Americans] in possession of their country was to leave the country in 
wilderness,” Marshall confirmed Native American land titles and stressed that they could 
not be extinguished without their consent. He did not concur with Vattel’s conclusion 
that “the savages of North America had no right to appropriate” vast expanses of land in 
the New World. To the contrary, in Worcester v. Georgia, Marshall adopted a broad 
interpretation of the usage criteria, noting “hunting was at that time the principal 
occupation of the Indians, and their land was more used for that purpose than for any 
other. It could not, however, be supposed, that any intention existed of restricting the 
full use of the lands they reserved.”92
Vattel, however, may have provided the foundations for Marshall’s notion of 
pupilage. In discussing the expansion of agriculture onto pastoral lands, Vattel 
recognized a responsibility on the part of advancing agriculturists to ensure the transition 
of pastoral peoples to a new way of life. Agriculturalists could “without injustice” 
expand into an area only if they taught the original inhabitants “the means of rendering” 
the land sufficient for their needs “by cultivation of the earth.” The advancing hosts had 
a responsibility for the civilizing progress of the original inhabitants, who effectively 
became wards until they had acquired the skills required to survive in a ‘higher’
92 Papers o f John Marshall, 7:229-41; Supreme Court Reports, 31:556.
47
civilization. Marshall’s notion of pupilage embodied such responsibility. The 
relationship was one of protection—the ward by the guardian—and Marshall was careful 
to point out that “protection [did] not imply the destruction of the protected.”94 He 
considered that the United States’ role as protector of Native Americans, their lands, and 
their sovereignty was enshrined in treaties and the Constitution. In this regard, Marshall 
was at odds with many of his fellow Virginians, even moderate republicans whose views 
were represented by James Monroe. “The hunter state can exist only in the vast 
uncultivated desert,” declared the fifth president. “It yields to the more dense and 
compact form of civilized population, and of right it ought to yield, for the earth was 
given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it is capable, and no tribe or 
people have the right to withhold from the wants of others more than is necessary for 
their own support and comfort.”95 Criticisms voiced by Berman, Williams, Norgren, and 
others might have been more appropriate for Marshall’s fellow Virginians than for him.
93 Ibid, 171.
94 Supreme Court Reports, 31:556.
95 James Monroe, The Writings o f James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, (New York, 1969), 40. 
Monroe’s argument was similar to that of Thomas Reid. Monroe, like Marshall, studied under Archibald 
Campbell.
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CHAPTER IV
MARSHALL, “THE OTHER,” AND THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT
Because of Marshall’s language of “savagery,” scholars such as Berman, 
Williams, and Norgren have regarded his opinions as having reinforced the image of 
Native Americans as “the other.” Some have viewed his decisions as a watershed.
Prior to his rulings, Native Americans were an “other” but they occupied or at least 
shared center stage in the New World. Marshall’s decisions helped to deprive them of 
full participation and citizenship in the new Republic and thus charted a course that 
marginalized them. He brandished the white man’s law against them.
Although Marshall recognized Native Americans as “the other,” a distinct people, 
he acknowledged them as having rights accorded to any people exhibiting “social 
faculty” and reason. He interpreted their rights according to the legal thought of his 
day— and he did so broadly. Marshall’s elaboration of Indian title was consistent with 
the emerging law of nations. His rulings were rooted firmly in treaties, proclamations, 
and the Constitution. Marshall’s judgments were consistent with prevailing legal 
thought, including principles of consent, duty, obligation, and custom and usage. His 
view of pupilage reflected Vattel, not Vitoria.
What many scholars have failed to recognize is that Marshall’s discourse on 
savagery was incidental to his opinions. His language merely reflected historical 
perceptions of his time, which drew on the colonial experience and views of differences 
in customs and habits embodied in the contemporary understanding of civilizing
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progress set out in the works of scholars such as Adam Smith and disseminated by 
writers like Samuel Stanhope Smith and William Robertson. Marshall, after all, was a 
product of the Virginian frontier, the Revolutionary War and the Scottish 
Enlightenment.96
More important, a review of nineteenth-century international jurisprudence 
supports this interpretation. A somewhat obscure dispute in Canada between a lumber 
company licensed by the Canadian government and the Province of Ontario involving a 
tract of land north of Lake Superior independently tested Marshall’s ruling. The dispute 
forced the justices of the Supreme Court of Canada to revisit the issues that Marshall 
confronted in his cases on Native American rights. The parallels with the challenges 
faced by Marshall were striking. The conflict arose two decades after Canadian 
Confederation. The issues involved private interests but raised concerns about Native 
American land rights and the division of powers between two levels of governments. In 
St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1886), the Canadian jurists 
were compelled to consider the law of nations and render judgments based on treaties, 
proclamations, and consensual agreements between nations. They had to revisit 
Marshall’s sources and reasoning. On balance, their opinions agreed with those of 
Marshall. In addressing specific situations, notably treaty negotiations in the Detroit 
region, their analysis reinforced his conclusions.
In the first recorded St. Catharines opinion, Justice W. J. Ritchie was forthright, 
though cryptic, and echoed Marshall.97 “I think the crown owns the soil of all
96 Newmyer stresses these points in his first chapter; see Newmyer, 1-68.
97 The Canadian justices filed separate opinions.
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unpatented lands,” stated Ritchie, “the Indians possessing only the right of occupancy, 
and the crown possessing the legal title subject to that occupancy, with the absolute 
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title.” Ritchie addressed the issues from an 
international rather than a Canadian perspective. In fact, he quoted Marshall’s trusted 
associate, Joseph Story, on the crown’s exclusive right to alienate Indian land noting “it 
is to be deemed a right exclusively belonging to the Government in its sovereign 
capacity to extinguish the Indian title and to perfect its own dominion over the soil and 
dispose of it according to its own good pleasure. ..The crown has the right to grant the 
soil while yet in possession of the Indians, subject, however, to their right of 
occupancy.98
Justice Strong delivered a lengthy opinion comprising some forty pages. He also 
took a North American perspective, which included a review of Marshall’s decisions. 
Similar to the American chief justice, Strong underscored the need to examine “the 
surrounding circumstances” and “history” in ruling on the Native American land claims. 
In reviewing events during the period when Sir William Johnson acted as 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Imperial Government and the Proclamation of 
1763 was announced, Strong followed an approach similar to that of Marshall.
Stressing the proclamation and treaties signed with Native Americans, Strong 
concluded that the crown recognized a “usufructuary title in the Indians to all 
unsurrendered lands.” This title “sufficed to protect the Indians in the absolute use and 
enjoyment of their lands, whilst at the same time they were incapacitated from making
98 Supreme Court Records (Canada), 13:599-600.
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any valid alienation otherwise than to the crown itself.” The Crown had absolute and
ultimate title. In supporting his ruling, Strong referred to Marshall’s reasoning in
Johnson v. McIntosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia. He
declared that Indian title could only be “properly surrendered or extinguished” by
formal treaty, which was an exclusive right of the Crown. In his summary, Strong
referred specifically to the American context:
To summarize these arguments, which appear to me to possess great force, we 
find, that at the date of confederation the Indians, by the constant usage and 
practice of the crown, were considered to possess a certain proprietary interest in 
the unsurrendered lands which they occupied as hunting grounds; that this usage 
had either ripened into a rule of common law as applicable to the American 
Colonies, or that such a rule had been derived from the law of nations and had in 
this way been imported into the Colonial law as applied to Indian Nations; that 
such property of the Indians was usufructuary only and could not be alienated, 
except by surrender to the crown as the ultimate owner of the soil."
Strong also agreed with Marshall’s reasoning that the Indian title set out in the 
Proclamation of 1763 was not disturbed by either the Quebec Act of 1774 or American 
Independence. “The Supreme Court of the United States had to deal directly with this 
identical point of the binding effect as a legislative ordinance, of the proclamation of 
1763, and with its operation at a date subsequent to the Act of 1774,” remarked Strong. 
In discussing the disputed land claims in Johnson v. McIntosh, he agreed with Marshall 
noting “the lands there in question were within the territory, which, by the Treaty of 
Versailles (1783) settling the boundaries between Canada and the United States, became 
part of the United States and was known as the Territory of Illinois, and these lands had 
been purchased from the Indians.. .in contravention of the terms of the
99 Supreme Court Reports (Canada), 13:602-39.
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Proclamation.”100
Justice Gwynne provided another detailed opinion stressing the Proclamation of 
1763, which he called an “Indian Bill of Rights.” Like Marshall, he documented the 
series of treaties that had been signed with Native American tribes as evidence of Native 
American rights to the soil and the Crown’s exclusive right to extinguish Indian title. He 
cited treaty negotiations that preceded American Independence, including General 
Thomas Gage’s extinguishment of Indian title to lands along the Detroit River. Gwynne 
confirmed “the most explicit recognition by the crown of the Indian title for upwards of a 
century in the most solemn manner—by treaties entered into between the crown and the 
Indian nations in council assembled according to their national custom, and by deeds of 
cession to the crown and of purchase by the crown.”101
The opinions of these Canadian Supreme Court jurists and their consistency with 
Marshall’s jurisprudence incorporated contemporary legal thought. If Marshall’s 
decisions on Native American land rights represented a watershed, it was one that 
marked a transition to positive law, not the intentional marginalization of America’s 
original inhabitants by an ‘interested’ chief justice.
|°° Ibid.
101 Supreme Court Reports (Canada), 13: 650-75.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
John Marshall left an “astounding” legacy in American constitutional law that 
still lingers over the United States Supreme Court in the twenty-first century. In recent 
decades, it has been tarnished by historians who have supported the view that Marshall, 
motivated in part by political, commercial, or personal interests contributed to Native 
Americans becoming “casualties” of conquest.102 The sentiments that he shared on the 
eve of his final Native American rights decisions with his trusted associate Joseph 
Story, however, undermine these scholarly criticisms of Marshall. In particular, they 
call into question critiques put forward by Jill Norgren alleging political motivations 
and by Eric Kades who emphasized commercial interests. They also clash with R. Kent 
Newmyer’s allusions to the influence of Marshall’s personal financial interests on his 
judicial opinions. A review of Marshall’s correspondence and Native American rights 
decisions does not suggest that the legendary chief justice sought to use the judicial 
branch during his tenure as a means to advance a political agenda or commercial 
interests at the expense of a people who he considered no longer threatened the 
expanding new nation. Marshall was acutely aware of the conditions of America’s 
original inhabitants as they struggled for subsistence and cultural survival; he 
demonstrated much sympathy for their plight. The historical evidence indicates that 
rather than an individual intent on fostering economic and commercial interests at all
102 Samuel R. Olken, “Chief Justice John Marshall and the Course of American Constitutional History,” 
Symposium on John Marshall and the United States Supreme Court 1801-1835, John Marshall Law 
Review, 33 (2000), 767-8; John Marshall, “The Events o f my Life”: an Autobiographical Sketch (Ann 
Arbor, 2001), 1-13.
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costs, he believed strongly that committing a defenseless people to “the general burial
103ground of their race” would “impress a deep stain on the American character.”
A re-examination of the foundations of Marshall’s opinions on Native American 
rights also does not support the criticisms of Howard Berman or the harsher allegations 
of Robert Williams to the effect that he intentionally sought to develop a hierarchical 
framework of law in which America’s original peoples would be established as a 
subordinate “other,” neither citizens nor aliens. Viewing the law of nations as an 
integral part of the new Republic’s jurisprudence, Marshall embraced a positivist 
approach grounded in the doctrines of renowned jurists and scholars including Hugo 
Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Cornelius van Bynkershoek, and Emmerich de Vattel. He 
also leaned toward philosophies of socially constructed justice advanced by leading 
thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment including David Hume, Adam Smith, and 
Thomas Reid. These influences are not surprising given that Marshall was schooled in 
Virginia where the ideas of leading Enlightenment thinkers were incorporated in the 
legal curriculum and disseminated by educators. The works of the moral scientists were 
held widely in libraries of the Old Dominion. Marshall also had a penchant for the 
“political essays of the day,” which frequently emphasized man’s reason, innate 
sociability, contractual rights and obligations—notions that lay at the very core of 
prevailing philosophies of justice and contemporary treatises on international law. 
Marshall recognized these principles in rendering judgment on the rights of Native 
Americans.
103 Story, 463; Papers o f John Marshall, 11:178-9.
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Marshall’s positivist approach was apparent early in his tenure on the Court. In 
Fletcher v. Peck, he classified a grant as a contract in accordance with Pufendorf and 
established the contract clause as a means to restrict state legislatures from overstepping 
their jurisdictions. In this manner, he transformed politically explosive issues into legal 
questions that could be resolved through reference to a growing body of written laws.
In Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall’s elaboration of Indian title incorporated distinctive, 
positivist leanings that built upon the Doctrine of Discovery as set forth by Grotius, 
Pufendorf, and Vattel. He ruled explicitly that the Doctrine of Discovery conferred on 
European nations only a right to acquire Indian title. Indian claims, existing from time 
immemorial, were not extinguished—nor could they be—without tribal consent. 
Marshall’s Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia rulings took account 
of Pufendorf’s doctrines on prescription and boundaries as well as Bynkershoek’s views 
on consent, treaties and tacit agreements between civil states. In framing his opinions, 
Marshall adhered to principles of socially constructed justice consistent with Scottish 
Enlightenment thinking. In Johnson v. McIntosh, Marshall specifically distanced his 
opinion from natural rights theory and ruled on the basis of “those principles which our 
government has adopted.”104
In light of allegations that Marshall’s decisions were motivated by political, 
commercial or special interests, his broad interpretation of Pufendorf’s principle of 
usage in Worcester v. Georgia and his rejection of Vattel’s argument that the effective 
use of non-vacant lands could serve as grounds to justify European land claims are
104 Papers o f John Marshall, 9:284.
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remarkable. Marshall’s interpretation of the language of the treaties of Holston and 
Hopewell, as well as his determination that the Constitution confirmed the validity of 
these agreements with the tribes in question, also indicated that rather than prejudicing 
rights of Native Americans Marshall sought to protect them against the advancing hosts 
in accordance with positive law. Far from seeking to stifle Native American initiative 
or wrest their lands, Marshall sought to give America’s original peoples wide rein to 
develop their communities through their own institutions. The state of ‘pupilage’ that 
Marshall envisioned in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia was not consistent with the 
wardship advanced by Francisco de Vitoria, which assumed ‘deficient agency’ on the 
part of America’s first people. Marshall acknowledged their ability to reason and he 
certainly recognized their treaty-making capabilities. His notion of pupilage is better 
understood in the context of Vattel’s writings on the responsibilities of agriculturists 
toward pastoral peoples when they occupied their lands. Marshall’s definition of 
domestic dependent nations was consistent with the continental jurist’s discussions of 
the obligations and rights of civil states entering into protectorate relationships.
Given the controversies occasioned by Marshall’s Native American rights 
decisions, the opinions of the justices of the Canadian Supreme Court in the nineteenth- 
century case of St. Catharines Milling and Lumber v. The Queen assume particular 
relevance. The Canadian justices were obliged to revisit many of the issues confronted 
by Marshall. Similar to the American chief justice, the Canadian justices grounded 
their opinions in positive law. They adopted an international perspective and their
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interpretation of proclamations and treaties concurred with those of Marshall. Their 
methodological approach to the issues was similar if not identical.
In conclusion, historians might be well-advised to take notice of how one of the 
most astute observers of the day, Cherokee Chief John Ross, framed his arguments as 
his people were “threatened with removal or extinction.” “We claim it [justice]” 
asserted Ross, “by the strongest obligation which it imposes on them [the United
1 n sStates]—by treaties.” Marshall agreed—any other view would have been a denial of
positive law. If Marshall’s decisions on Native American land rights represented a 
watershed, it was one that marked a transition to positive law, not the intentional 
marginalization of America’s original inhabitants by an interested chief justice.
105 Indian Affairs, 18th Congress, no. 208.
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